<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
		>
<channel>
	<title>Comments on: Browser-based mitigation of phishing attacks</title>
	<atom:link href="http://dready.org/blog/2007/01/22/browser-based-mitigation-of-phishing-attacks/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://dready.org/blog/2007/01/22/browser-based-mitigation-of-phishing-attacks/</link>
	<description>musings on internationalized identifiers: domain names, OpenID, TLDs</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Sat, 08 Jun 2013 08:17:07 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=3.4.1</generator>
	<item>
		<title>By: Kim Cameron&#8217;s Identity Weblog &#187; Can browser-based plugins solve the phishing problem?</title>
		<link>http://dready.org/blog/2007/01/22/browser-based-mitigation-of-phishing-attacks/comment-page-1/#comment-9010</link>
		<dc:creator>Kim Cameron&#8217;s Identity Weblog &#187; Can browser-based plugins solve the phishing problem?</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 12 Feb 2007 05:35:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dready.org/blog/2007/01/22/browser-based-mitigation-of-phishing-attacks/#comment-9010</guid>
		<description>[...] Dready blog proposes writes about OpenID phising and proposes a browser plugin that introduces a delay in the dialog box before it can be dismissed. The OpenID phishing issue is a hard one to solve, particularly because it aims to: [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Dready blog proposes writes about OpenID phising and proposes a browser plugin that introduces a delay in the dialog box before it can be dismissed. The OpenID phishing issue is a hard one to solve, particularly because it aims to: [...]</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: wil</title>
		<link>http://dready.org/blog/2007/01/22/browser-based-mitigation-of-phishing-attacks/comment-page-1/#comment-8863</link>
		<dc:creator>wil</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 22 Jan 2007 00:40:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dready.org/blog/2007/01/22/browser-based-mitigation-of-phishing-attacks/#comment-8863</guid>
		<description>@Claus:

This is just how Firefox displays IDNs where the TLD is not on their whitelist (and &quot;.com&quot; is not.) For IDNs on the whitelist, this will render properly in Unicode.

I should have made this clear and show just an ASCII case, thanks for the clarification.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>@Claus:</p>
<p>This is just how Firefox displays IDNs where the TLD is not on their whitelist (and &#8220;.com&#8221; is not.) For IDNs on the whitelist, this will render properly in Unicode.</p>
<p>I should have made this clear and show just an ASCII case, thanks for the clarification.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: 3247</title>
		<link>http://dready.org/blog/2007/01/22/browser-based-mitigation-of-phishing-attacks/comment-page-1/#comment-8862</link>
		<dc:creator>3247</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 21 Jan 2007 23:48:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dready.org/blog/2007/01/22/browser-based-mitigation-of-phishing-attacks/#comment-8862</guid>
		<description>Your example shows the domain name in ACE format (xn--pypal-4ve.com). This is only a good idea if the real domain is not an IDN.

For users of legitimate serves not using pure-ASCII domains, this will make any comparision impossible.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Your example shows the domain name in ACE format (xn--pypal-4ve.com). This is only a good idea if the real domain is not an IDN.</p>
<p>For users of legitimate serves not using pure-ASCII domains, this will make any comparision impossible.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: =marcin</title>
		<link>http://dready.org/blog/2007/01/22/browser-based-mitigation-of-phishing-attacks/comment-page-1/#comment-8861</link>
		<dc:creator>=marcin</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 21 Jan 2007 18:47:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://dready.org/blog/2007/01/22/browser-based-mitigation-of-phishing-attacks/#comment-8861</guid>
		<description>I posted my remarks to list, but I&#039;ll repeat them here. In my opinion it is not the issue of effectiveness of warning.  While idea of &quot;delay box&quot; is good, the problem noticed here:

&quot;phisher can replace the password input field with javascript / DHTML / flash to bypass the check&quot;

is more vital. My idea is: if phisher wants to bypass the check, we should warn the user. How? By NOT changing browser UI. 

So my idea is: let&#039;s change browser UI in a significant, visible way on every page that contains password field. Let&#039;s warn users if password field looks suspicious. And let&#039;s NOT change UI if it&#039;s not a password field. User will notice the difference.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I posted my remarks to list, but I&#8217;ll repeat them here. In my opinion it is not the issue of effectiveness of warning.  While idea of &#8220;delay box&#8221; is good, the problem noticed here:</p>
<p>&#8220;phisher can replace the password input field with javascript / DHTML / flash to bypass the check&#8221;</p>
<p>is more vital. My idea is: if phisher wants to bypass the check, we should warn the user. How? By NOT changing browser UI. </p>
<p>So my idea is: let&#8217;s change browser UI in a significant, visible way on every page that contains password field. Let&#8217;s warn users if password field looks suspicious. And let&#8217;s NOT change UI if it&#8217;s not a password field. User will notice the difference.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>
